| Yes, yes.... I see it now, it is getting clearer and clearer. "Mr. President, I need just 40,000 more troops on the ground" said Gen. Westmoreland via SecDef McNamara. "Mr. President, I just need 60,000 more troops on the ground. I can see the light at the end of the tunnel" said Gen. Westmoreland via SecDef McNamara.
Vietnam redux.
In present force structure, it takes 3 or 4 and maybe 5 combat service and combat service support troops to put one shooter on the ground. Using that logic, 40,000 troops means maybe 10,000 shooters. Keep in mind that the use of armor is significantly limited, artillery has a limited role and motor transport is a death trap. Again, using the same logic, what we have is the combat support and service support in base camp enclaves providing support via helicopter and air drops, fire support bases providing supporting fire as necessary, a heavy aviation fire support and service support contingent and the shooter in the field.
In convential configuration, force on force ratios call for a 4 to 1 manpower superiority. If the "bad guys" in Afghanistan have an estimated 25,000 shooters on the ground (they really don't have much of a logistical tail), logic calls for the "good guys" to have 100,000. In unconvential configuration (counter-guerrilla operations) that force on force ratio increases to (an estimated) 10 to 1. Again, if the "bad guys" have 25,000 shooters; are we prepared for a 200,000 (plus) commitment?
My .02. |