A critical look at the ERSM / Route Irish ambush

[esrice]

This ambush is often referenced here on INGO in regards to the videos and topics surrounding James Yeager. But we have yet to actually gather the evidence in one place and examine it fully.

Here in the Tactics & Training section we often try such exercises, looking for the good, the bad, and the ugly of high-stress situations. The end goal being that we can all learn from the circumstances and the actions that were or were not taken.

In that vein I've asked INGOer thebishopp to provide this thread with links to supporting AARs and videos that will allow us to have a discussion on what happened that day.

If you wish to participate in this thread we ask that you stick to the topic at hand, give complete and honest answers, and only give opinions supported by documented evidence. We're not asking for what you think happened.

Here are some basic questions to help guide the discussion:

• What was done right?
• What mistakes were made?
• How could the ambush had been handled better? Would the outcome have been different?

If you'd like to join the discussion please review all the evidence provided before posting.


Thanks!

 

[the1kidd03]

First, to give it a little context please realize that he was there as a contractor, not a US military soldier/Marine. Therefore, he would have had entirely different SOPs which may have and very likely did include the priority to be "get out of harms way" rather than "locate, engage, and destroy."

What I see wrong with the video (from what I remember of it) is assuming military (and more specifically USMC) SOPs. What was their SOPs or his team's mission specifically, I don't know if anyone knows exactly.

 

[the1kidd03]

BTW, good idea for a post esrice. I'm surprised this wasn't done earlier.


For future posters...."welcome to the jungle"

 

[esrice]

First, to give it a little context please realize that he was there as a contractor, not a US military soldier/Marine.

Here shortly thebishopp should give us all the needed details to help everyone form a complete opinion.

 

[thebishopp]

I will post the text of the made public ESRM Official AAR of the Incident as well as the text of James Yeager's personal AAR.

Note that initially I was only going to post the official AAR however it would be foolish to believe that there isn't information in Mr. Yeagers report that may help paint a more rounded "picture" of what happened.

In addition the complete video available online will be posted. I will be uploading it to my own youtube channel so I can change the title (it seems most of them say something about Mr. Yeager and we are trying to keep that part out of it).

It is my understanding that this is not to be a "who's right who's wrong, questions of bravery, who's lying who isn't, etc. etc." type of thread so I would appreciate it if we could keep it to the actual topic as listed by Esrice.

Please hold of on posting till I have all three sections up. Company AAR. Yeager AAR, Video. That way the info isn't broken up.

 

[the1kidd03]

Here shortly thebishopp should give us all the needed details to help everyone form a complete opinion.

I will post the text of the made public ESRM Official AAR of the Incident as well as the text of James Yeager's personal AAR.

Note that initially I was only going to post the official AAR however it would be foolish to believe that there isn't information in Mr. Yeagers report that may help paint a more rounded "picture" of what happened.

In addition the complete video available online will be posted. I will be uploading it to my own youtube channel so I can change the title (it seems most of them say something about Mr. Yeager and we are trying to keep that part out of it).

It is my understanding that this is not to be a "who's right who's wrong, questions of bravery, who's lying who isn't, etc. etc." type of thread so I would appreciate it if we could keep it to the actual topic as listed by Esrice.

That's why I posted what I did. From a military perspective (different SOPs and there's a lot of vets on this board) they did a few things wrong. Since they were not military, their end goal/motivation was different and cannot/should not be judged under that basis.
Morally, is a WHOLE other question which is based on opinion and shouldn't have a place in this discussion either.

 

[thebishopp]

Official Company AAR:

What follows is the text of what is claimed to be the offical ESRM company AAR of the Irish Road Incident:

EDINBURGH RISK AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

AFTER ACTION REVIEW

OPERATION APOLLO CONTACT BIAP ROAD 20 APRIL 2005

BACKGROUND

On 20 April 2005 Edinburgh Risk personnel assigned to Operation APOLLO (support to the Independent Election Commission of Iraq) were engaged by enemy forces on Route IRISH (BIAP Road) during the execution of their duties.

Post incident Edinburgh Risk, in keeping with company policy and operational SOP’s, conducted a full deliberate review conducted by an external assessor of the incident along with corresponding verbal and written AAR’s. The assessor for this review was the Group’s USA Managing Director. He has extensive operational experience in the military and as a civilian contactor/ operator. Having spent August 2003 to December 2004 in Baghdad, he is well familiar with the specific challenges posed by the insurgency in Iraq.

This report is the only official Edinburgh Risk report in regards to the incident.

AIM

The overall aim of this report is to identify friendly and enemy action during the contact in order to extract lessons identified that may be applicable to current and future operations.

INCIDENT

Phase 1 - Pre-mission orders: Prior to the move, during the evening Order’s Group 19 April 05, a warning order was issued to members of the APOLLO team who would be conducting a road move to BIAP in order to pick up operators coming in from rotation. Instructions were issued in accordance with a standard military warning order with additional discussion conducted in regards to the teams SOP for dealing with the VBIED/IED threat on Route IRISH. In order to mitigate the threat of IED/VBIED attack the team was in the process of instituting a number of SOP’S in regards to the use of new operational methods to help mitigate the threat. The team reviewed video footage taken of Route IRISH during previous moves in order to identify choke points, danger areas and likely areas of enemy attack. The team was also concerned with blue on blue incidents and stressed the need to be prepared to identify themselves as required so as to avoid blue on blue with Coalition or other PSC’s operating on Route IRISH.

Phase Two- Mission Orders: On the morning of 20 April 05 the team task organized for the days move and met to conduct an Operations Group. The O Group was conducted utilizing the standard 5 paragraph Op Order format. All operators were present for the order. The detail leader, Allan Johnson, conducted the O group utilizing video footage, again, to identify danger areas and to brief the team’s scheme of maneuver during the movement. Alternatively Simon Merry and Steph Surett briefed with the drivers in regards to the route and actions on when approaching danger areas, coalition or other PSC call signs. Orders were conducted from 1100 hours to 1130 hours. At approximately 1130 hours the team mustered for their final inspections and departed for BIAP.

Phase Three- Movement: The team was task organized as follows:

Lead/Advance Vehicle consisting of Soft Skin BMW Sedan
James Yeager - Driver
Steph Surette - Vehicle IC
Mark Collen - Rear Gunner (medic)

Center/Main Body B6 Armored Mercedes
Driver- Simon Merry
Vehicle IC- Ian Harris (mission 2 IC)

Rear/Follow Vehicle consisting of Soft Skin BMW Sedan

Driver - Chris Ahmelmen
Vehicle IC – Allan Johnson (overall mission commander)
Rear Gunner - James (Jay) Hunt

The team departed through Gate 12 at approximately 1140 after linking in with the Ops Room where they dropped off their route and mission card with Edinburgh Risk Ops. The team also contacted the ROC to check on the status of Route IRISH and the ROC informed them that the route was open.

Team movement was going according to plan until the team reached RV 5. RV 5 was assigned as the last foot bridge/flyover heading west just prior to the checkpoint leading into BIAP/VICTORY.

As the team reached RV5, traffic was coming to a halt and the team was halted just beneath or just outside of RV5 with the main body vehicle coming to a halt just beneath the foot bridge. The team was halted at approximately 1155 hrs.

Traffic to the front was halted due to Coalition Forces closing the road in response to an incident on the road. The team estimates that Coalition Forces were located 300-400 meters to the front of their position while halted at RV 5.

During the halt the team reports that there were approximately 10 local national vehicles to their front which cleared the area by either driving back down towards traffic and utilizing a slip road to leave the area or by crossing the median and traveling down the alternate lane of travel.

Al Johnson called for the team to move forward in order to create depth between the motorcade and local national vehicles to the rear as well as to take them out from under the foot bridge/fly over which was deemed to be a threat as it presented a danger area due to the possibility of attack from above.

The motorcade moved forward approximately 300 meters giving the rear gunner, Jay Hunt, in the rear vehicle enough clearance to cover the foot bridge with fire if required whilst also allowing the team to cover and close the slip road located to the right front of the motorcade so as to prevent enemy attack from that location.

At this time the three vehicles are spaced at approximately 100 meters between vehicles with the motorcade occupying an area estimated to be 300-400 meters in length from the front vehicle to the rear vehicle.

During the halt Al Johnson and Ian Harris discuss crossing the median in order to leave an area where they feel they are exposed. The decision is made not to cross the median as they are concerned that the vehicles will not clear the obstacle presented by the median.

While the team was halted Mark Collen identified a suspect vehicle along the slip road to the right flank, north, of the motorcade at a distance of approximately 500 meters. He took the vehicle under surveillance utilizing a scope mounted upon his M4. He observed one local national male in the vehicle and noted that the vehicle occupant was not paying the call sign any attention and seemed to be concentrating his attention on local national traffic halted to the suspect vehicles front. He assessed that the suspect vehicle was not a threat and informed the team accordingly.

The team remained static for approximately ten minutes while it waited to see if Coalition Forces would open the road. At approximately 1200-1210 Al Johnson made the decision to abandon the position and was in the process of ordering the team to move when the team came under intense automatic weapons fire.

Phase Four- Contact: As stated at approximately 1210 hrs, the APOLLO team was engaged with heavy automatic weapons fire which originated from north of their position along the slip road bordering Route IRISH. All three vehicles sustained damage and casualties during the initial burst of gun fire. It is assessed that the team was engaged by two or more PKM belt fed GPMG firing armor piercing ammunition. The armored sedan suffered hits which would have normally defeated standard ball ammunition. During the initial burst of gun fire the APOLLO team suffered three casualties which consisted of Jay Hunt, Chris Ahmlemen, and Steff Surette. Two of the operators Jay Hunt and Steff Surette were wounded in the hip/groin area and suffered sever trauma to the femoral artery while Chris Ahmlemen was shot in the hip and head with the head wound killing him outright.

Upon the initiation of contact the lead vehicle driven by James Yeager attempted to drive out of the kill zone and was unsuccessful as Yeager had taken the car out of drive placing it in neutral and setting the emergency hand brake which prevented him from driving out of the kill zone during the opening stages of the contact. Upon failing to drive “off the X” Yeager, Mark Collen and Steff Surette evacuated the vehicle. Steff Surette at this point was already wounded and was located beside the vehicle in the prone though he was attempting to remain in the fight. James Yeager fell to the rear of the vehicle in order to return fire and engage enemy forces. According to James Yeager he could not identify enemy forces and thus he attempted to suppress the general vicinity of where he suspected enemy fire was coming from. After having fired an estimated half a magazine of ammunition out of his M4 Yeager broke contact from the rear of his vehicle and maneuvered to the median to the south of the engagement area. Mark Collen also positioned at the rear of the vehicle identified enemy forces firing from a white suburban vehicle and engaged the white suburban with approximately 100 rounds of 5.56 from his M249 Minimi. He then experienced a stoppage and switched to his M4 with which he continued to engage the enemy forces located within the white suburban. The white suburban drove out of sight and at that point Mark Collen provided immediate medical care to Steff Surette.

Concurrently vehicle two, the armored sedan attempted to first maneuver to its front in order to provide cover to vehicle one. Simon Merry, driver of vehicle two, reported that the car was unresponsive as it had suffered damage during the initial burst of GPMG fire which caused catastrophic damage to the transmission. Ian Harris, IC of vehicle two, exited the vehicle as the vehicle was under heavy fire. He then maneuvered to the front bonnet of vehicle one so as to provide suppressive fire in support of the team. Ian was able to identify enemy forces located within the white suburban and fired semi-automatic, well aimed fire into the rear of the vehicle. Ian reported that his fire seemed to be “bouncing off” the rear of the vehicle and, upon interviewing other team members who took the suburban under fire, they believe that the suburban was armored as their fire had little or no effect on the enemy vehicle. Ian came under severe enemy fire whilst he attempted to suppress enemy forces but he continued the attempt to win the firefight. After attempting to move the vehicle forward in support of vehicle one Simon Merry attempted to move the vehicle to the rear to provide cover for vehicle three but again, the vehicle was unresponsive. Simon Merry then exited the vehicle and positioned himself to the rear of the vehicle in order to provide covering fire to vehicle three. Simon in accordance with team SOP’S deployed a smoke grenade to the north of the motorcade in order to mask the callsign.

Vehicle three occupied by Al Johnson, Chris Ahmlemen, and Jay Hunt was engaged as well during the initial burst of GPMG fire with Chris Ahmelmen, the driver, being killed - thus the vehicle remained static. Jay Hunt who was hit in the initial burst attempted to evacuate the vehicle and take enemy forces under fire but was almost immediately out of the fight due to the nature of his wounds. Al Johnson the vehicle IC evacuated the vehicle in order to try and treat Jay Hunt and Chris Ahmlemen. He moved Jay Hunt to a position of cover behind the left front tire of the vehicle and then moved to treat Chris Ahmlemen who was by then deceased. He then returned to treat Jay Hunt who was hit in the femoral artery.

The initial contact lasted 32 seconds in accordance with the video footage taken from a dash mounted camera in vehicle three. Within that 32 seconds three operators were combat ineffective due to enemy fire and related wounds and all three vehicles were disabled either through mechanical failure and/or driver errors and wounds. All three vehicles were taken under fire almost simultaneously which leads to the belief that there was more than one enemy element engaging the motorcade though only one enemy element was ever identified by the members of the team. The volume of enemy fire and the consistency and accuracy of that fire in relation to a callsign that was spread out over three hundred meters indicates either a very proficient enemy operator or the presence of more than one GPMG during the contact.

Enemy forces engaged the motorcade for no more than one minute and ten seconds at which point they had evacuated the engagement area.

Upon disengagement with enemy forces the team consolidated its position with Mark Collen and Al Johnson continuing to provide medical treatment to Jay Hunt and Steff Surette while the rest of the team provided 360 degree security.

Phase Five- Consolidation: Simon Merry signaled to Coalition Forces (CF) who were located three hundred meters to their front (west of the contact area) who responded to the signals by approaching the engagement area slowly with three Humvees. Concurrently James Yeager left his position at the median and moved to vehicle three in order to provide close in support and security to Al Johnson who was still attempting to treat Jay Hunt. While, at the rear of vehicle three, Yeager engaged a local national vehicle that was attempting to move into the engagement area from the east on Route IRISH. Believing this to be a possible VBIED, Yeager fired two shots into the vehicle at which point the vehicle stopped and did not attempt to move any closer into the engagement area.

At this point Coalition Forces had reached vehicle one with Ian Harris providing them an immediate sit-rep as to the situation while asking for CF support in order to evacuate the casualties. CF took command of the scene and instructed Ian Harris to police up team members, equipment and vehicles that were mobile and evacuate the scene. They instructed the team to move to Camp VICTORY where CF would evacuate the wounded team members to the Camp VICTORY Aid Station.

Ian Harris rallied the surviving team members and loaded into vehicle’s one, two and three. Vehicle two was un-serviceable and thus abandoned. Al Johnson stayed with CF forces and was still treating Jay Hunt along with a CF medic at this point. Al Johnson was hit in the buttocks during the engagement but continued to remain behind in order to insure that CF treated and evacuated the wounded/dead. Ian Harris evacuated the team with vehicles one and three departing for the CASH at Camp VICTORY.

During the consolidation and preparation for evacuation a call sign from Olive Security approached the motorcade from the east on Route IRISH arriving at vehicle three and interfaced with Al Johnson and James Yeager. Olive offered assistance to the team and, due to the fact that CF forces had run out of room within their FLA, Olive evacuated the body of Chris Ahmlemen along with some team equipment. Olive proceeded to Camp VICTORY meeting Edinburgh Risk call signs at the check point leading into BIAP/VICTORY and instructed the team to follow them into VICTORY as they had the body and equipment with them. Al Johnson had been loaded onto the CF FLA and moved to the CASH at VICTORY via the CF FLA. Olive remained with the APOLLO team at the CASH and continued their support. At the CASH, Chris Ahmelmen and Jay Hunt were pronounced dead and Steff Surette was undergoing treatment during which he died. Al Johnson continued to stay with the casualties until he was ordered by the military to receive treatment. The remaining team members consolidated all equipment and personnel and returned to Edinburgh Risk HQ located within the International Zone. Support was provided to the remaining members of the call sign for this move by Edinburgh Risk’s Operation Hermes and continued support from Olive.

SUMMARY

Given the nature of the contact, the violence of action executed by a capable enemy force and the volume of enemy fire levied upon the team during the initiation of the contact, the team responded as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Without doubt, this was a highly capable and well rehearsed group of insurgents initiating a deliberate ambush.

Retrospectively, the team should not have remained static for a protracted period of time in a canalized area such as Route IRISH. It is understandable that the team tried to create depth between themselves and local national traffic due to the threat of VBIED on the BIAP road. Inadvertently, this maneuver also resulted in the team unmasking from the concealment provided by low profile saloon vehicles within the main body of local traffic. During the debrief the team acknowledged the fact that they were static in one location for too long a time however they also state that they were in the process of leaving the area when enemy contact was initiated – it is possible that the enemy deliberately waited for this moment to initiate the contact.

Actions during the contact itself were conducted in accordance with the team SOP. The team attempted to drive out of the kill zone but this action was precluded due to operator error for vehicle one and mechanical failure due to enemy fire with vehicles two and three. Upon failing to extract by vehicle the operators evacuated the vehicles and established a base of fire in order to suppress enemy forces so as to then be able to break contact as required. The fact that the team suffered 50 percent casualties in the initial volley of fire detracted from their ability to sufficiently suppress the enemy thus also negating their ability to then break contact. James Yeager in accordance with the team SOP attempted to break contact in the opening stages of the contact yet fire superiority and or suppression had at that time not been established. Ian Harris and Mark Collen, each under heavy enemy fire, were the only two individuals during the contact who attempted to suppress enemy forces. Simon Merry was continuing to try to maneuver his vehicle to a position of support to vehicle one and then two whilst Al Johnson was busily treating multiple casualties at his location with vehicle three. James Yeager was in a location at the median where he could not engage enemy forces as he did no have a line of fire from his location. Ian Harris as team 2 IC provided leadership to the team through the use of verbal commands and fire control while the team leader, Al Johnson attended to the wounded personnel from his vehicle. Ian Harris, with assistance from Coalition Forces and Olive Security, consolidated the team and evacuated the area.

LESSONS IDENTIFIED

Many of the lessons identified are well known but it is worth reiterating them:

• If forced to go static on Route IRISH (or any route for that matter) teams need to act in accordance with SOP and immediately evacuate the area.
• If enemy forces initiate fire it is imperative that the team under fire first establish fire superiority prior to breaking contact. It is imperative that team members who have eyes on the enemy call out fire direction, distance and description so as to alert other team members to the enemy location. You can not maneuver until you have established an aggressive base of fire.
• Team Leaders should have no additional duties other than that of team leader.
• Crew Served Weapons must be kept running during the course of the fight. If one goes down due to a wounded or killed operator then that weapon must be immediately put back into action by another team member.
• Every move needs to include at a minimum one weapons system utilizing 7.62 NATO in order to defeat enemy forces employing hard and soft skin vehicles.

CONCLUSION

PSCs have experienced countless attacks on Route IRISH as well as on other MSRs within Iraq. PSCs, while having the ability to defend themselves and their clients to a degree, will only be as successful as the conditions established by Coalition and Iraqi security forces. The fact that enemy forces can mass and execute operations in the vicinity of Route IRISH as well as throughout Iraq is a testament to the current conditions within Iraq. PSCs, in order to operate successfully, must swim in a sea of security established by “green army”. If general security is not established by Coalition and Local National security forces to a degree that precludes the enemy’s ability to operate in strength across Iraq then PSC’S and their clients will continue to become a collateral target of an insurgency that operates with impunity.

Signed on Original

Christopher Farina
Managing Director
Edinburgh Risk and Security Management
ERSM-USA LLC
Reston, Virginia
USA

 

[thebishopp]

Mr. Yeager's personal AAR:

What follows is the text of what is claimed to be Mr. Yeager's personal AAR of the Irish Road Incident:

BIAP 4.20.2005

The Ambush of Edinburgh Risk and Security Management’s Operation Apollo

Prepared: April 22nd, 2005 by James Yeager Job Title: Operator Rank: None
Contact: JamesYeager@TacticalResponse.com

Orders were at 1100hrs Baghdad local time (+9 CST) on April 20th, 2005.
We had our typical set of orders covering the aspects of the trip. We have
heard them so many times we can all most likely recite them while asleep.
Team leaders Al “Johno” Johnson and Stef Surette gave the mission briefing.
We were going to Baghdad International Airport (aka BIAP) to pick up two
ERSM employees, one of which was an Operation Apollo team member.

Vehicle One: Black unarmored BMW manual transmission Driver: James Yeager,
Primary weapon Bushmaster semi-auto AR-15 with 11.5” barrel Vehicle
Commander and Medic: Stef Surette, Primary weapon 7” barrel full auto AR
Rear Gunner and Medic: Mark Collen, Primary FN M-249 secondary Bushmaster M-4

Vehicle Two: Black armored Mercedes automatic transmission Driver: Simon
Merry, Primary MP-5 secondary Bushmaster M-4 Vehicle Commander: Ian Harris
Primary Bushmaster M-4

Vehicle Three: White unarmored BMW automatic transmission Driver: Chris
Ahmelman MP-5 and M-4 Mission Commander and lead medic: Al Johnson Mission
Commander, MP-5 and M-4 Rear Gunner: James Hunt II, Primary RPK, Secondary
FN M-249, and Tertiary an M-4

All carried Glock model 19s as a sidearm.

We followed our written S.O.P. in relation to dress which is a locally
procured ankle length shirt (also known as a “man dress”) that had been cut
off at the waist to make me look like an Iraqi while seated in a car.
Everyone wore something like that and/or a Shemag (the “rags” locals wear
on their heads that gets them the “rag head” moniker).
The mission began at approximately 1125hrs. We departed the Green Zone
(also known as the International Zone) checkpoint 12 like we do every time
unless it is closed then we take our singular alternate route out the July
14th Bridge. The short trip flowed smoothly until we were within
approximately ½ mile of the relative safety of Camp Victory and BIAP.

We got stopped in traffic at Rally Point #4 which is the final overpass
between BIAP and the Green Zone. The U.S. Army had stopped traffic because
they were at the scene of an I.E.D. (Improvised Explosives Device) that had
severely damaged a Sport Utility Vehicle. “BIAP Road” is a divided highway
with a median strip. It is also a limited access road like an American
Interstate which uses entry and exit ramps for access. There was an
impromptu stop sign in the middle of our two lane road and orange cones
letting traffic know to stay well back.

There was also 2-3 Humvees with at least one of them pointing a .50
caliber heavy machine gun, which I knew would go through an armored car, in
our direction to make sure no vehicles got close. Since we had made a
conscious decision to drive cars that looked like the locals and dress like
the locals I hesitated to get closer than 200-300 yards. There have been
more incidents of the Military shooting at PSDs than terrorists which is
completely understandable because as a group we tend to drive aggressively,
try to blend in with local vehicles, dress like locals and carry weapons
often times in plain view if not sticking out of the windows.

I had moved my rifle from the console to my lap when we stopped. Our cars
were about 25 yards apart. I watched my “Area of Responsibility”. As the
driver of vehicle one I had to watch from my seat’s 12 o’clock counter
clockwise around to 8 o’clock. Jay Hunt, who was the rear gunner in vehicle
three, had the largest area to watch from the vehicle’s 9 o’clock around to
the 3 o’clock.

While we sat in traffic our Team Leader (One I.C.) and lead Medic “Johno”
fired multiple bursts from his MP-5 submachine gun from vehicle three. He
got outside the car to do it at least once. My estimation is 3-4 bursts of
3-4 rounds each. He did this to “warn them off” (cars) in the rear because
they were getting too close. Johno’s area of responsibility was not the
rear. The rear was Jay’s responsibility. Johno was neglecting his 12
o’clock to 3 o’clock position. Each time he fired his weapon he was drawing
unwanted attention our way and not watching his side of the car. His side
of the car is the one in which our attack came from minutes later.

After his second burst I removed my “Haji dress” because there was
nothing between those U.S. Army .50 caliber heavy machine guns and us and I
didn’t want them to look down the road at the gunfire and see all of us
wearing local clothing to include Shemags and engage us. Besides my fear of
being shot by the U.S. Military, after Johno began shooting, I assumed the
cars near us knew we were Contractors anyway. Our “cover” if we ever had
one was now non-existent.
After being directly under the overpass for several moments (maybe 10) we
pulled forward about 100 meters to where the final on-ramp to BIAP Road
entered. I pulled my number one vehicle far right, as instructed by my team
leader Stef, to block traffic from coming onto the roadway. After about
10-15 minutes I took the car out of gear and pulled on the emergency break
because my calf was beginning to ache. I would end up regretting that
decision.

To our right was a “frontage” road or “slip” road about 75-100 yards out
that ran parallel to BIAP Road. There were houses just on the other side of
that road. After a few moments one of the guys (I think commander of
vehicle two: Ian Harris) spotted a small white sedan on the slip road. He
asked that someone look at it with binoculars. We didn’t have any but Mark
had a telescopic sight on his rifle. He stated it was parked and the sole
occupant was talking on the phone, wasn’t paying attention to us, and
wasn’t a threat. I said aloud “He is a ****ing Dicker.” (Dicker is what the
Brits call a “lookout”.) My car commander Stef, who heard me, never
acknowledged.
About three to five minutes after we saw the Dicker (approximately 1350
hrs) I heard another volley of fire and I thought to myself “What the ****
is Johno shooting at NOW?!” I felt rounds hitting the car and I heard the
distinctive supersonic crack of a round pass through our car, inches in
front of my face, from right to left missing Stef and

I. Stef yelled “I’m hit!” and he began emptying a 30 round mag out his
window.

I need to mention at this point that both of the other guys in my car saw
a large white SUV with black tinted windows rolling slowly down the
frontage road heading the same direction we were pointing. They apparently
drove a short distance and whipped into an intersection, did a u-turn, and
stopped momentarily pointing their vehicle in our direction. This event
took several minutes. Mark later said that the passenger window was down in
the SUV but he could not see inside and he kept looking in other directions
because he didn’t consider the vehicle to be a threat. There were two other
people with the area of responsibility in which the attack came from in
vehicles two and three and NOBODY reported ANYTHING.

After I went through my O.O.D.A. Loop (please search Google for OODA
Loop and Col. John Boyd for more info) I punched the gas to the floor and
the engine raced but the car wouldn’t move. I thought it had it been
knocked out of commission. After what seemed like an eternity, but was a
couple of seconds, I grabbed the door handle and began implementation of
our ambush S.O.P. for a disabled car in which the first step is getting out
of the car. I remembered I was in a stick shift that was in neutral with
the emergency brake on as I hit the ground, and the point of no return, and
moved to the rear wheel. I not sure how long it takes to empty a 30 round
magazine on full auto but I began firing before Stef emptied his gun the
first time.
As I shot from the rear of the car I wanted to kill the terrorists but
nobody had told me the direction (I figured that one out on my own),
description, or distance. I fired because I have been trained to fire when
someone is shooting at me. If I couldn’t make hits I was sure going to make
noise. Half the distance to the slip road there were some Hesco barriers
and dirt was flying off the top of them. I thought maybe Stef had seen
someone behind them and was shooting at them. I now realize it was merely
rounds from our team being shot without using the sights. At the time I
didn’t know and because there were houses directly beyond that it was the
safest place for me to shoot. I shot about 6-10 aimed rounds into the
barriers utilizing my EOTech weapon sight.

I felt Mark coming out of the rear door so I began the next phase of our
S.O.P. which is getting away from the car (getting off the “X”) because
people tend to shoot at cars and rifles easily penetrate them. I turned and
ran toward the median which was about 40 feet to the edge. I got face down
on the edge of the asphalt, took a firing position, and yelled “MOVE!” to
Mark.

I am sure Mark had trouble hearing me as he fired the M-249 across the
back of vehicle one. I pulled my rifle to my cheek, looked through my
EOTech again, scanned the roof tops and almost shot some clothes hanging
off a TV antenna to dry. Nobody was there. I scanned the windows of the
houses. I KNEW I heard a PKM and I KNEW the PKM was hitting us well and was
most likely in a static position. I scanned the Hescos again. Nothing.
“Where the **** is it?” I wondered as I searched. I began aiming between
the windows of the houses and shooting the solid brick walls. Although I
didn’t know who I needed to kill I knew they were that direction
“somewhere”. I felt useless but I thought I might be able to keep their
heads down. Mark’s 249 went down (broken or bent belt) and I fired while he
grabbed his M-4.

“****!” I thought to myself. I had forgotten to deploy a smoke grenade.
When Mark resumed firing I ripped it out of the pouch, peeled off the
100mph tape, put the spoon in the palm of my hand, straightened the ends of
the pin out, and pulled the ring. I kept thinking about my Instructor
course for and teaching the proper deployment of flashbangs, smoke, and CS.
My mind was racing. I forced myself to focus. I wanted to obscure Mark and
Stef and so I heaved the high concentration smoke as hard as I could and
managed to get it on the far side of their car.

While this was happening I heard sporadic outgoing gunfire from cars two
and three, I wasn’t sure which vehicles but I was glad to hear them
shooting because I knew they were alive. I was hoping that cars two and
three were communicating and covering each other. Mark and I were filling
in each others gaps of fire.

I thought my magazine was nearing empty and while Mark was firing I took
the time to do a tactical reload on my rifle and get my bearing. I looked
to my rear and the opposite side of the road and it was all clear. I looked
on the overpass and it was all clear. I looked at car number three and I
saw Jay Hunt with blood all over his crotch. I heard him tell Johno “I’m
hit in the femoral buddy.” very calmly. He slid himself toward the front of
the car so that Johno could apply first aid from behind the engine which
was the safest spot. I looked at Chris. He was still in the driver’s seat
slumped lifelessly to the left against the door.
I checked car two, the armored Mercedes, Simon and Ian were uninjured
and now in the fight. I was glad to see them. Although Simon got out with
an MP-5 and he quickly discarded it with for an M-4. I was glad to see that
as well. I looked at car one and saw Stef was out of the car but he was
going down. Although I knew he told me he was hit he had still been in the
fight and got out of the car under his own power. I did not realize the
extent of his injuries.

I began speaking to Simon who was the closest to me. The next phase of
our S.O.P. was, if the cars were down, to commandeer a vehicle from the
opposite side of the road, load the dead and wounded, and escape. I asked
Simon, who was the closest to me, if he wanted to help me get a couple of
cars. He was drawn back into the chaos in front of him and never responded.
I yelled “WHO ARE WE SHOOTING AT!?!” as loud as I could to nobody in
particular and got no reply.

Ian and Simon were now communicating with Mark. Mark has asked them to
move the armored car, vehicle two, up for cover so he can attend to Stef’s
injuries. Ian at some point here ran to vehicle one and began covering
Mark. Simon tried to move vehicle two but it barely limped forward. It was
not moved into a position to cover Mark and Stef. Simon got out and moved
up to vehicle one and provided cover for Mark. Since I was not actively
shooting at the terrorists I was still searching the areas the guys are NOT
shooting at so we have full 360 degree security.

I now know that Mark has assistance and if Simon and Ian cannot help him
that there is certainly nothing I can do for him. I shift my attention to
Johno who is alone at vehicle three. He is now working on Jay’s injuries
frantically and calling for help. I run to him. When I get there I can tell
Johno is trying to cover his 360 and work on Jay at the same time. Jay was
still breathing but his respirations were becoming labored. I reassured
Johno that I had him protected as I scanned the area. After a few moments a
car drove toward us from the rear. I waive them off but they do not stop. I
fired twice and they stopped.

Johno tells me he is out of bandages. I motion toward my medical pouch
and he grabs one of mine. He didn’t realize it, and I didn’t think to tell
him, but I had a packet of TraumaDEX in the pouch as well. I could hear the
Humvees driving up from the BIAP end of the road (the direction we were
traveling) and the Soldiers talking to the others. I was relieved to
finally know we had help. Johno and the medic asked for help removing Jay’s
Paraclete Releasable Assault Vest. I reach over and yank the ripcord off
and the vest fell off allowing the ready access.
Almost simultaneously I see a man walking toward us from the opposite
direction. He is white and dressed like a PSD operator although he was
wearing no armor and carried no weapon. I find out later he works for U.K.
based Olive Security. I yell to him “DO YOU HAVE ANY BANDAGES!?!” he holds
up his finger in a “wait a minute” fashion as he strolls my way. I yell
louder “DO YOU HAVE ANY BANDAGES!?!” He replies with what I think was an
Australian accent “Can we drive through?” I was stunned, simply stunned,
that he had the NERVE to ask to drive through. He was within 20 feet now
and I said “DO YOU HAVE ANY ****ING BANDAGES!?!” He ignored me and walked
past to one of the just arriving U.S. Soldiers and asked if he could drive
through.

The Soldier asked “Do you have an SUV?” The man replied “Yes. Can I
drive through?” The Soldier said “Get your SUV up here and put that body in
it. (Pointing to Chris)” He replied “But we are in a terrible hurry!” The
Soldier said “Do it now.” In a much more pleasant tone than I thought the
man deserved. The man began to protest and the Soldier clearly, firmly, and
loudly stated “DO YOU HAVE A D.O.D. CARD?!” The man replied “Yes.” The
Soldier said “THEN I AM YOUR ON SCENE COMMANDER AND I ORDER YOU TO GET YOUR
S.U.V. UP HERE AND LOAD UP THAT BODY…NOW!!!!” He finally complied and
meandered back toward his truck obviously put off.

The soldier told me to get Chris’ body from the driver’s seat. Johno and
a military medic worked on Jay as I opened the door and caught Chris. He
had begun to fall out. It happened very quickly from here but the car,
which was an automatic, was still in gear and when I pulled Chris out the
car began rolling away toward Jay. If Johno had not reacted quickly Jay
would have been crushed by the car. I had to drop Chris’ body and run
around the opposite side of the car to get inside. Luckily a soldier on the
other side was able to get in and switch it off before it crashed into a
Humvee that was backing up to avoid the collision.
Jay and Stef were attended to by military medics and were rushed to the
closest medical facility at Camp Victory. Johno and the Olive PSD team
loaded Chris’ body in the back of their SUV and followed. The 4 uninjured
survivors (Ian, Simon, Mark, and I) got into all three vehicles and drove
toward the Camp Victory entrance as commanded by the Military. The armored
Mercedes sustained enough damage from the gunfire that it could not move
the few hundred yards to the checkpoint. We abandoned it on the roadside.

Other Details

Everyone that was wounded was wounded by the initial volley of gunfire.
Stef and Jay both received wounds to their pelvic / upper thigh region that
severed their femoral arteries upon the initial contact. Even though they
were injured they stayed in the fight. I am unable to assess how many
rounds Jay actually fired but it was several. Stef emptied a 30 round
magazine (loaded with 28) and reloaded and fired an unknown number of
rounds from the second magazine.

I never knew during the firefight which vehicle (or house, or person,
etc) was shooting at us and I was the first one in position to deliver
accurate, sustained, and deadly return fire and I didn’t know where to aim
my gun. I received no serious injuries.
Mark fired with the FN M-249 until it stopped functioning. He estimates
he got 60-80 rounds through it first. He switched to his M-4 and fired as
well. I am not sure if he ever reloaded the M-4. He received no serious
injuries.

Simon was the driver of car number 2 I feel as if he should have been
watching the same areas as me and therefore never would have seen the SUV
and might not have been told either. He had an MP-5 in his lap but he
switched to an M-4 shortly after the gunfire erupted. He never had a target
and never fired. He received no serious injuries. Ian never had to reload
his M-4. He received no serious injuries.

Johno emptied a full magazine in his MP-5 and reloaded one time. He was
shot through his left buttock and was still providing Jay with care. Johno
and I expended all our bandages on our person and from his back pack trauma
kit just caring for Jay. Later the doctors at the medical center would say
that Mark and Johno did an outstanding job.

Johno was the mission Commander, Ian was second in command, and Stef was
third. Nobody was giving any clear commands so in the end I just filled in
gaps to the tactical jigsaw puzzle the best I could.

Chris was wounded through the leg first and instead of moving off the “X”
he spent the last seconds of his life telling Johno about it while he took
another round through his throat and one through his head.

We had two unarmored cars and one armored car. All injuries came from
within the unarmored cars. Both of the unarmored cars, while hit multiple
times, were never disabled. Although the rounds that impacted the passenger
compartment of the armored car did not penetrate, the transmission/engine
was destroyed as well as the fuel tank being ruptured.

As soon as our group started shooting the terrorists became disinterested
in staying in the fight which is their modus operandi.

There was never a point during the incident where I was affected by any
of the mental affects of adrenaline like auditory exclusion or tunnel
vision. The reason I point this out is because apparently Olive Security
told our team they fired at the SUV. Not only do I not remember seeing or
hearing it happening you cannot hear their “7.62” on our video.

I had the least amount of time in the Middle East of anyone on that
mission. I have no time in the military; I was a 12 year Cop. My bio is on
my website for anyone who wants to read it www.TacticalResponse.com

"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his
friends" -John 15:13
There is an AAR separate from this document.

 

[thebishopp]

The uncut (from what I can find) video claiming to be of the actual Irish Road Incident:

[ame]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv6QuCzLUMw[/ame]

 

[esrice]

So as I'm watching the full video I now see (hear) where the 3rd car is firing rounds into the air while waiting on the road.

Obviously that kind of thing is unheard of here (stateside). Would it have been common for PSDs to do such a thing to hold traffic back? It seems like that would immediately identify you as a security detail and draw unneeded attention.

Is that normal? Or could it be one of the first mistakes?

 

[HICKMAN]

What makes you think they are in the air?

Go watch some Blackwater vids in Iraq. They shoot and ram cars out of the way.

 

[esrice]

What makes you think they are in the air?

Just going by the AAR when comparing it to the video. It never says where the rounds went, but I got the impression they were "warning shots" fired into the air. Regardless, I'm curious if that is 'normal'.

While we sat in traffic our Team Leader (One I.C.) and lead Medic “Johno”
fired multiple bursts from his MP-5 submachine gun from vehicle three. He
got outside the car to do it at least once. My estimation is 3-4 bursts of
3-4 rounds each. He did this to “warn them off” (cars) in the rear because
they were getting too close.

 

[esrice]

Still watching the full video.

From the time they come to a stop just under the bridge to the time they come under fire is 25 minutes. That seems awfully long to be "exposed". You can hear the occupants of Car #3 talking the entire time and they are suspicious of EVERY vehicle. Twenty-five minutes is a LONG time to be in "Condition Orange".

Obviously with the benefit of hindsight we can say that sitting there that long was a mistake. But was it a mistake at the time it happened? I think so.

And that jives with ERSM's AAR:

Retrospectively, the team should not have remained static for a protracted period of time in a canalized area such as Route IRISH. It is understandable that the team tried to create depth between themselves and local national traffic due to the threat of VBIED on the BIAP road. Inadvertently, this maneuver also resulted in the team unmasking from the concealment provided by low profile saloon vehicles within the main body of local traffic. During the debrief the team acknowledged the fact that they were static in one location for too long a time however they also state that they were in the process of leaving the area when enemy contact was initiated – it is possible that the enemy deliberately waited for this moment to initiate the contact.

If forced to go static on Route IRISH (or any route for that matter) teams need to act in accordance with SOP and immediately evacuate the area.

 

[the1kidd03]

Local drivers tend to pay closer attention to a "warning shot" out of a ma-deuce more so than a honking horn. IDK about PMCs (or PSCs, whatever you want to call them), but military often times tries to avoid remaining stationary and if vehicles appear to possibly hinder their movement (or otherwise pose a potential threat), then yes they will be "scared away." I know a few 0331s who rather enjoy the opportunity.

Again, I can't speak for PMCs' "normal" SOPs. Here again is that difference at play. They are open to much more scrutiny than government backed military...

NOTE: I'm not a convoy ops expert. I've only learned what I know from those who've performed those operations far more than I. Several very close friends were "security operations" 0331s.

 

[netsecurity]

Asides from not sitting out in the open for twenty minutes, the only thing to increase survivability I can see would be all armored cars.

 

[thebishopp]

So as I'm watching the full video I now see (hear) where the 3rd car is firing rounds into the air while waiting on the road.

Obviously that kind of thing is unheard of here (stateside). Would it have been common for PSDs to do such a thing to hold traffic back? It seems like that would immediately identify you as a security detail and draw unneeded attention.

Is that normal? Or could it be one of the first mistakes?

If their intention was to remain incognito then that was obviously a mistake. You can't "conceal" yourself and try blending into the populace while you are also doing things that cause you to stand out.

IMO, if they were going to try to blend in then they needed to do just that. If they wanted to roll like a military convoy then they needed to be in armored vehicles with very visible heavy weapons.

The point of standing out and presenting a hard target is to actually look like a hard target to deter all but the most determined enemy from attacking. The stronger you look the less likely a lesser group will pick you to attack.

I think ESRM's "lessons learned" are on point as well:

LESSONS IDENTIFIED

Many of the lessons identified are well known but it is worth reiterating them:

• If forced to go static on Route IRISH (or any route for that matter) teams need to act in accordance with SOP and immediately evacuate the area.
• If enemy forces initiate fire it is imperative that the team under fire first establish fire superiority prior to breaking contact. It is imperative that team members who have eyes on the enemy call out fire direction, distance and description so as to alert other team members to the enemy location. You can not maneuver until you have established an aggressive base of fire.
• Team Leaders should have no additional duties other than that of team leader.
• Crew Served Weapons must be kept running during the course of the fight. If one goes down due to a wounded or killed operator then that weapon must be immediately put back into action by another team member.
• Every move needs to include at a minimum one weapons system utilizing 7.62 NATO in order to defeat enemy forces employing hard and soft skin vehicles

 

[the1kidd03]

I WILL say this; anyone here can/should question the validity of an MP5 in that environment/type of mission...

That wasn't JY's decision I'm sure, but still. I would have told my boss to give me better weapons appropriate for the job if my life was on the line.

 

[thebishopp]

I WILL say this; anyone here can/should question the validity of an MP5 in that environment/type of mission...

That wasn't JY's decision I'm sure, but still. I would have told my boss to give me better weapons appropriate for the job if my life was on the line.

I would have to agree. In defense of the operators though I don't think they had much of a say what their kit was going to consist of. If the fellow made the personal choice of carrying the MP5 I would say that was a huge mistake. You would think that it is common sense though to carry at least one heavy weapon like a 7.62 (minimum). A LAW in the backseat would have been a good idea as well, imo. They are in a warzone after all, not the streets of new york (heck there are places in the U.S. where it would be nice to have a LAW in the backseat lol).

 

[the1kidd03]

I would have to agree. In defense of the operators though I don't think they had much of a say what their kit was going to consist of. If the fellow made the personal choice of carrying the MP5 I would say that was a huge mistake. You would think that it is common sense though to carry at least one heavy weapon like a 7.62 (minimum). A LAW in the backseat would have been a good idea as well, imo. They are in a warzone after all, not the streets of new york (heck there are places in the U.S. where it would be nice to have a LAW in the backseat lol).

That and those government contracts specifically lay out exactly what weapons they are authorized to use/have access to. Most I've read were modern use military weapons (m16, 240, SAW, etc).

 

[thebishopp]

That and those government contracts specifically lay out exactly what weapons they are authorized to use/have access to. Most I've read were modern use military weapons (m16, 240, SAW, etc).

I forgot about that. That would also limit what they can use. I had a few aquaintences working with various groups over there -blackwater, triple canopy, custer battles (before custer got into all that trouble), etc. Their "kits" consisted of M4s and Beretta 92s (I should say "most" as some had access to 7.62 caliber weapons).

One of them had either saws or m60s mounted to the back of heavy pickup trucks but I was told that a lot depended on the company. Some took care of their people better than others but none of them ever really complained.

The belief was it was their choice to work with a company or not. If they thought the money wasn't worth the risk they would go with a different company or not go at all.