Came across this on Faceybook.. Must be true.

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  • BADWOLF

    Sharpshooter
    Rating - 100%
    5   0   0
    Jul 24, 2015
    366
    18
    Small Town USA
    1st. One is true.
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murdock_v._Pennsylvania

    (((( Decision of the Court ))))

    Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional tax on the Jehovah's Witnesses' right to freely exercise their religion.

    The petitioners used the distribution of pamphlets and brochures as a form of missionary activity with an evangelical purpose. Not all behavior could be allowed by claiming that it was a religious activity. The only hold that spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types. If the activity were done in order to raise money, it would be commercial and could be taxed. However, in this case, although donations were sought, the activity served a religious function. Religions are not entirely free from facing financial burdens from the government. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. If the exercise can be taxed then the government is capable of making it prohibitively expensive and could only be done by the wealthy. The state claimed that this argument was unimportant because the tax was not expensive in practice. It is a license tax-a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution. The fact that the ordinance was imposed indiscriminately does not save it from being unconstitutional.

    This case also established the preferred position doctrine, which states that "[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred position," indicating that certain fundamental human rights have prerogative.

    2nd one is a far stretch
    https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/147/

    (((( The Court Held ))))

    1. A law subjecting the right of free expression in publicly owned places to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards is unconstitutional, and a person faced with such a law may ignore it and exercise his First Amendment rights. Pp. 394 U. S. 150-151.

    2. Picketing and parading may constitute methods of expression entitled to First Amendment protection, and use of the streets for that purpose, though subject to regulation, may not be wholly denied. P. 394 U. S. 152.

    3. Since the terms of § 1159 gave the Commission unbridled authority to issue or withhold parade permits without reference to legitimate regulation of public streets and sidewalks, the ordinance would be, absent a limiting construction, unconstitutional on its face. Pp. 394 U. S. 150-151, 394 U. S. 153.

    Page 394 U. S. 148

    4. The narrow construction that the State Supreme Court placed upon § 1159 in 1967 doe not necessarily validate petitioner's 1963 conviction; the test is whether the ordinance was actually administered

    "so a not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places."

    Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 312 U. S. 574. Pp. 394 U. S. 153-155.

    5. Since, in this case, § 1159 was administered in accordance with its impermissibly broad language, so as to "deny or unwarrantedly abridge" the First Amendment right of the petitioner and his organization, the petitioner's conviction may not stand. Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, distinguished. Pp. 394 U. S. 155-159.

    281 Ala. 542, 206 So.2d 38, reversed.
     
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